W&M ScholarWorks
Arts & Sciences Articles

Arts and Sciences

2009

Imagery and fear influence height perception
Elise M. Clerkin
Jeanine K. Stefanucci
William & Mary

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/aspubs

Recommended Citation
Clerkin, E. M., Cody, M. W., Stefanucci, J. K., Proffitt, D. R., & Teachman, B. A. (2009). Imagery and fear
influence height perception. Journal of anxiety disorders, 23(3), 381-386.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts and Sciences at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Articles by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

Journal of Anxiety Disorders 23 (2009) 381–386

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Anxiety Disorders

Imagery and fear inﬂuence height perception
Elise M. Clerkin a,*, Meghan W. Cody a, Jeanine K. Stefanucci b, Dennis R. Profﬁtt a, Bethany A. Teachman a
a
b

University of Virginia, United States
College of William & Mary, United States

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Article history:
Received 1 May 2008
Received in revised form 30 November 2008
Accepted 3 December 2008

The current study tested whether height overestimation is related to height fear and inﬂuenced by images
of falling. To assess perceptual biases, participants high (n = 65) versus low (n = 64) in height fear estimated
the vertical extents of two balconies using a visual matching task. On one of the balconies, participants
engaged in an imagery exercise designed to enhance the subjective sense that they were acting in a
dangerous environment by picturing themselves falling. As expected, we found that individuals
overestimated the balcony’s height more after they imagined themselves falling, particularly if they
were already afraid of heights. These ﬁndings suggest that height fear may serve as a vulnerability factor
that leads to perceptual biases when triggered by a stressor (in this case, images of falling).
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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Clinicians have long recognized the seeming perceptual
distortions that many fearful clients exhibit. For an individual
with a phobia, a small garden snake may achieve epic proportions,
a harmless spider might appear to scurry at breakneck speeds, and
a neutral expression can suddenly ‘‘look’’ like a menacing scowl.
Drawing from these anecdotal claims, our goal with the current
study was to examine the relationship between visual perception
and height fear. Moreover, we sought to investigate one of the
mechanisms that may underlie perceptual biases—imagery that
enhances fears of interacting in a ‘‘dangerous’’ environment.
The idea that biases in visual perception might be associated
with pathological anxiety has received some prior empirical
support. For instance, Riskind, Kelly, Moore, Harman, & Gaines
(1992) found that spider fearful (versus non-fearful) individuals
reported relatively faster forward motion of a spider while viewing
a video of a spider crawling toward them (but not of a rabbit
moving forward). Similarly, Rachman & Cuk (1992) found that
fearful (relative to non-fearful) individuals verbally reported
greater estimates of a snake’s ﬂickering tongue movements and
a spider’s jumping movements, and that these biases were
diminished following fear reduction. While these types of studies
provide intriguing clues as to the ways in which fear may alter
visual perception, their reliance on hypothetical interactions with
the feared object and/or verbal report makes it difﬁcult to
determine the extent to which the observed biases were primarily
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cognitive, perceptual, or both. It is possible, for instance, that
reports of greater movement in these studies were simply due to
distortions in judgment or other cognitive biases, as opposed to
biased visual perception.
To help address this issue, researchers have begun to utilize
measures that minimize cognitive inﬂuences in order to more
directly investigate perceptual biases in psychopathology. For
instance, Stefanucci, Profﬁtt, Clore, & Parekh (2008) asked participants to estimate the slant of a hill while they stood either on a
skateboard or on a wooden box of the same height. Researchers
found that individuals who reported fear while standing on the
skateboard perceived the hill as steeper, relative to individuals who
stood on the box and were unafraid. Furthermore, in a precursor to
the current study, we demonstrated that individuals high (versus
low) in acrophobia (height fear) symptoms overestimated the
vertical extent of a balcony (Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, &
Profﬁtt, 2008). Moreover, such perceptual distortion remained even
when controlling for cognitive biases. Accordingly, we concluded
that emotional states, such as fear, may be related to what people see
at a perceptual level.
This research grew out of work in the ﬁeld of visual perception
examining the extent to which non-visual factors inﬂuence
perception. For example, in a series of studies examining spatial
layout, researchers demonstrated that expectations, intent, and
effort are implicated in visual perception (see Profﬁtt, 2006). In
fact, research suggests that if one is wearing a heavy backpack
while looking at a hill, the slope will appear steeper (e.g., Bhalla &
Profﬁtt, 1999). According to Profﬁtt (2006), this is because visual
perception ‘‘promotes survival by making us aware of both the
opportunities and costs associated with action’’ (p. 111). In other
words, when the metabolic costs of ascending a hill become more
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pronounced (i.e., carrying a heavy backpack while climbing), it is
adaptive to ‘‘see’’ the slope as steeper.
Similarly, fear can play an adaptive role in one’s functioning.
There is good reason to feel fearful, for instance, if one encounters a
truly dangerous situation because it promotes avoidance and other
safety behaviors. In the present study, our goal was to increase the
apparent danger in a height-relevant situation to determine
whether this would affect visual perception. Speciﬁcally, we
manipulated imagery of falling based on prior research that imagery
can effectively enhance perceived threat (Sherman, Cialdini,
Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). We chose to focus on fears of
falling because of the obvious risk of injury (or worse) that falling
confers, and because it is a common fear among acrophobic patients
(Menzies & Clark, 1995). Thus, manipulating imagery of falling
seemed like a logical means to enhance the perceived costs
associated with being in a high place, particularly among height
fearful individuals.
To examine the effect of falling imagery on perceptual biases,
we asked individuals who were high versus low in acrophobic
symptoms to estimate the vertical extents of two balconies. On one
of the balconies, participants were asked to engage in a brief
guided imagery exercise designed to heighten the subjective sense
that they were acting in a dangerous environment by picturing
themselves falling. Following Profﬁtt (2006), we hypothesized that
amplifying the immediate danger of being on the balcony through
imagery (thus enhancing the perceived cost of acting near its edge;
e.g., falling) would lead participants to overestimate the balcony’s
apparent vertical extent. We also expected individuals high
(versus low) in height fear to perceive the balcony as higher
(based on Teachman et al., 2008) because height fearful individuals
presumably exaggerate the costs of being on the balcony.
1. Method1
1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology or
other classes and were offered course credit or payment for
completing the study. Additionally, some participants were
community volunteers who responded to newspaper advertisements seeking individuals who were either very afraid or not at all
afraid of heights. Participation was completely voluntary, and this
study was approved by the University of Virginia Institutional
Review Board.
All interested individuals completed a screening measure: the
anxiety subscale from the Acrophobia Questionnaire (AQ—Anxiety;
Cohen, 1977), which has a mean of 27.10 and standard deviation of
17.32 in a student sample (Cohen, 1977). In the present study,
individuals who scored greater than or less than one standard
deviation from the prior student sample mean (i.e., 45 and above or 9
and below) were invited to participate. This recruitment strategy
yielded a total sample of 129 participants (n = 65 high fear, 78%
female; n = 64 low fear, 70% female). Mean age was 20 years
(S.D. = 7.95). For the high fear group, race was reported as 66%
Caucasian, 6% Black or African American, 18% Asian, 2% Native
American or Paciﬁc Islander, 3% bi- or multiracial, and 5% other.
Ethnicity in the high fear group was reported as 88% not Hispanic/
Latino, 9% Hispanic/Latino, and 3% declined to answer. For the low
fear group, race was reported as 91% Caucasian, 0% Black or African
1
Only those materials relevant to the current hypotheses are listed here. For a
more complete description, please contact the ﬁrst author. For instance,
participants also completed a measure of attentional bias (the dot-probe task), a
measure of implicit bias (the Implicit Association Test), and a measure of behavioral
avoidance. All participants completed the same procedures. The main exception to
this was that the target on one of the balconies was missing for a subsection of
participants (n = 10); thus, these participants did not complete the size estimation
task.

American, 2% Asian, 0% Native American or Paciﬁc Islander, 3% bi- or
multiracial, 3% other, and 2% declined to answer. Ethnicity in the low
fear group was reported as not 91% Hispanic/Latino, 8% Hispanic/
Latino, and 2% declined to answer.
1.2. Height exposures
Two balconies were used for the height estimates, one at 26 ft
(7.92 m) and the other at 33 ft (10.06 m) from the ground. Both
were enclosed by ledges approximately 3 ft (0.91 m) high. Balcony
order for the exposures was counterbalanced, but participants
always received the imagery manipulation on the second balcony
so that this manipulation would not inﬂuence the other balcony
estimation.
1.3. Measures
1.3.1. Height fear
To verify the validity of the fear group classiﬁcation, participants completed the full Acrophobia Questionnaire (AQ; Cohen,
1977) at the conclusion of the study. The AQ is a 40-item measure
of height phobia with anxiety and avoidance subscales. On the day
of testing, Cronbach’s alpha for the anxiety and avoidance
subscales was .96 and .89, respectively. While standing on both
balconies, participants also completed a measure of anxious
cognitions, the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire (ACQ;
Chambless, Caputo, Bright, & Gallagher, 1984). This questionnaire
was modiﬁed slightly to reﬂect anxious thoughts related to heights
(e.g., ‘‘I am going to fall,’’ ‘‘The railing will not protect me’’). Note
that for ease of discussion, the ACQ will be discussed primarily as a
measure of costs; however, it is important to clarify that this type
of cognitive bias is likely composed of an interaction between the
probability of a negative event, such as falling, occurring and the
associated costs (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985).
In addition, participants reported their anxiety-related bodily
sensations on both balconies, using a modiﬁed Body Sensations
Questionnaire (BSQ; Chambless et al., 1984). Both the ACQ and the
BSQ have been shown to have good internal consistency and test–
retest reliability (Chambless et al., 1984). Cronbach’s alpha for the
ACQ on both balconies was .89, while alpha for the BSQ was .93 on
the ﬁrst balcony and .94 on the second. Finally, participants rated
their subjective fear on a 0–100 verbal analogue Subjective Units of
Distress Scale (where 0 is not at all afraid and 100 is panicked;
SUDS; Wolpe, 1990) several times throughout the experiment.
1.3.2. Manipulation check
Participants were asked to rate the vividness of their mental
imagery on a 0–100 verbal analogue scale after completing the
tasks on both balconies (where higher numbers indicate increasingly vivid images of the self-falling off the balcony).
1.3.3. Visual perception
For the height estimation task, participants were asked to look at
a target disk on the ground beneath the balcony. They then
estimated the height of the balcony by positioning an experimenter
the same distance away from them horizontally along the balcony as
they were vertically from the target on the ground. The experimenter recorded the distance, and the ratio of overestimation was
computed (the participant’s estimate divided by the actual height of
the balcony) so that the height estimates across the two different
balconies (26 and 33 ft) would be on the same metric. For instance,
an estimate of 30 ft given for the 26-ft balcony would result in an
overestimation ratio of 1.15. The height estimate was our primary
measure of perceptual bias, but in order to provide a converging and
less direct measure of height estimation, a subsample of participants
also estimated the size of the target disk by instructing the
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for ‘traditional’ height fear measures.
Full sample
M

High height fear
S.D.

M

25.43
6.42
5.64
6.24
7.24
8.24

56.97
11.2
6.4
7.81
8.25
10.06

N = 129
Acrophobia Questionnaire—Anxiety
Acrophobia Questionnaire—Avoidance
Anxious Cognitions Questionnaire—No Imagery Balcony
Anxious Cognitions Questionnaire—Imagery Balcony
Bodily Sensations Questionnaire—No Imagery Balcony
Bodily Sensations Questionnaire—Imagery Balcony

35.45
6.72
3.53
4.32
4.65
5.74

experimenter to adjust a tape measure (held up with the blank side
facing the participants) until it matched the diameter of the target.
This measure was included because the apparent size of the target
should be related to estimates of apparent distance (here, height)
following the size–distance invariance hypothesis (i.e., the frequently found relation between apparent size and distance; Epstein,
1973). Two different sized targets were used, a 16-in. (40.64 cm)
target2 for the smaller (26-ft) balcony, and a 20-in. (50.80 cm) target
for the larger (33-ft) balcony. Again, the ratio of size overestimation
was computed by dividing the participant’s estimate by the actual
diameter of the target. For both the height estimation and size
estimation tasks, participants were encouraged to look back and
forth between the experimenter and the target as often as they
needed.
1.4. Procedure
Following informed consent, participants were taken onto the
ﬁrst balcony (either the 26- or 33-ft one; this was counterbalanced) and instructed to look over the ledge while reporting
their initial fear level using the SUDS rating of 0–100. They then
completed the height estimation task followed by the target disk
size estimation task. While still on the balcony, participants were
instructed to complete the ACQ and BSQ in counterbalanced order,
using a clipboard that was positioned on the ledge (so that
participants had to stand close to the edge of the balcony, facing
outward). Administration of the questionnaires while on the
balcony was considered important to enhance the sense that
participants were still interacting in the height environment while
making their ratings. They then were asked to rate the extent they
imagined themselves falling off the balcony, on a scale of 0 (no
image at all) to 100 (a vivid image of self-falling). Finally, participants
were asked to report their peak level of fear during the balcony task
using the SUDS rating.
Following the ﬁrst balcony exposure, participants were taken to
the second balcony and again asked to look over the ledge and
report their initial fear level. Next, participants were asked to close
their eyes while the experimenter read a brief imagery induction
script. Participants were instructed to imagine themselves leaning
out far over the edge of the balcony and losing their balance. They
were led to form an image of themselves falling to the ground,
using multiple senses and relating the imagery to real memories of
falling. After generating the image, participants were instructed to
hold it in their minds and replay it over and over for 30 s. After
imagery manipulation, participants again reported their state fear
level using the 0–100 SUDS ratings and completed the height

Low height fear
S.D.

M

15.20
5.86
6.74
7.18
8.69
9.69

13.59
2.17
0.61
0.89
1.00
1.43

N = 65

S.D.

N = 64
10.77
2.68
1.18
1.75
1.68
2.28

estimation, size estimation, ACQ, BSQ, imagery rating, and peak
SUDS rating, following the same procedure as on the ﬁrst balcony.
After completing tasks on both balconies, participants were
brought back inside and given the AQ and measures of cognitive
and avoidance biases that are not reported here (see footnote 1).
Finally, an exit interview was conducted to check for knowledge of
the hypotheses and suspicion of deception before participants
were fully debriefed.
2. Results
2.1. Sample characteristics
Independent samples t-tests indicated that fear groups differed
on anxiety and avoidance tied to height fear in the expected
direction (AQ—Anxiety and Avoidance: t111.60 = 18.81, p < .001,
d = 3.31). The high fear group reported greater anxiety and
avoidance than the low fear group. Across both balconies,
individuals high (versus low) in height fear also reported greater
anxious cognitions (ACQ—No Imagery Balcony: t67.96 = 6.82,
p < .001, d = 1.20; ACQ—Imagery Balcony: t69.20 = 7.43, p < .001,
d = 1.32) and fear of bodily sensations (BSQ—No Imagery Balcony:
t68.85 = 6.59, p < .001, d = 1.16; BSQ—Imagery Balcony: t68.87 = 6.88,
p < .001, d = 1.23). Together, these ﬁndings conﬁrm validity of the
fear group classiﬁcation (see Table 1). Note, distributions for selfreport measures of state height fear (e.g., ACQ, Imagery ratings, BSQ,
and Peak SUDs) were highly skewed so results with these measures
should be interpreted with some caution [skew was not a signiﬁcant
problem for the primary perceptual bias outcome measures (i.e.,
height overestimation) or trait height fear measure (AQ—Anxiety
and Avoidance)]. Additionally, degrees of freedom for the independent samples t-tests were corrected for unequal variances when
applicable (based off of a Levene’s test for equality of variances);
hence, the degrees of freedom vary across tests.
Chi-square tests revealed that there were no signiﬁcant group
differences in gender (x2 = 1.13, p > .10). Unexpectedly, there was
a signiﬁcant group difference in race (x2 = 14.08, p = .001), so this
variable was used as a covariate in subsequent analyses (comparing Caucasian, Asian, and all other races). There was also a nonsigniﬁcant trend for an age difference across the groups
(t65.17 = 1.98, p = .052, d = 0.35), which was driven by four
individuals in the high fear group who were much older than
the other participants (R = 57–76 years old) [note: when excluding
these four people, there was no signiﬁcant between-groups
difference in age (t114.19 = .13, p > .10, d = .02)].
2.2. Imagery manipulation and perceived costs

2
A different target of unknown size had been used for the ﬁrst half of the
participants on the smaller balcony. Due to experimenter error, this target was lost,
and a 16-in. target was made to replace it. The size estimation analyses for the
smaller balcony reported below only include the data for the participants who
viewed the new target, because a number of participants had missing data for the
lost target.

To evaluate whether imagery manipulation was effective at
inducing a vivid image of the participant falling over the balcony’s
ledge, imagery ratings were compared across balconies. We
conducted a repeated measures Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA),
with one between-subjects factor (Height Status) and one within-
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Fig. 1. Group differences in falling imagery ratings. Note: Group mean (and S.E. bars)
for falling imagery ratings while on the balconies. Higher scores indicate more vivid
imagery. In this ﬁgure, the asterisks reﬂect a signiﬁcant main effect of Height Status.

subjects factor (Balcony: Imagery versus No Imagery). As expected,
individuals reported a more vivid image of themselves falling after
the imagery induction (F(1,124) = 143.20, p < .001, hp2 = .54),
indicating that the manipulation was successful. There was also
a signiﬁcant main effect for Height Status (F(1,124) = 20.76, p < .001,
hp2 = .14), and a signiﬁcant interaction between Height Status and
Balcony (F(1,124) = 5.69, p = .02, hp2 = .04). As expected, analysis of
simple effects within each fear group indicated that both groups
reported a more vivid image of themselves falling in the Imagery
condition, relative to the No Imagery condition (High Fear:
F(1,62) = 62.09, p < .001, hp2 = .50; Low Fear: F(1,61) = 84.81,
p < .001, hp2 = .58). Additionally, individuals high (versus low) in
height fear reported more vivid images of themselves falling off
both balconies (Imagery Balcony: F(1,124) = 5.05, p = .03, hp2 = .04;
No Imagery Balcony: F(1,124) = 41.94, p < .001, hp2 = .25), and this
group difference appeared to be larger for the No Imagery balcony.
See Fig. 1.
Next, given our goal of enhancing the perceived dangerousness of
the situation, we examined whether anxious cognitions tied to
heights (on the ACQ) were exacerbated as a function of the imagery
manipulation. Again, we conducted a repeated-measures ANCOVA,
with one between-subjects factor (Height Status) and one withinsubjects factor (Balcony: Imagery versus No Imagery). In line with
expectations, participants were more likely to overestimate the
costs of being on the balcony following the imagery induction
(F(1,123) = 9.31, p = .003, hp2 = .07). Additionally, there was a signiﬁcant main effect for Height Status (F(1,123) = 54.66, p < .001,
hp2 = .31), and a signiﬁcant interaction between Height Status and
Balcony (F(1,123) = 5.83, p = .02, hp2 = .05). Follow-up tests to examine
the source of the interaction revealed that individuals high in height
fear reported more anxious cognitions than individuals low in height
fear across both balconies (Imagery Balcony: F(1,125) = 53.65,
p < .001, hp2 = .26; No Imagery Balcony: F(1,123) = 54.54, p < .001,
hp2 = .31). Additionally, analysis of simple effects within each fear
group indicated that the high fear group reported more anxious
cognitions in the Imagery condition, relative to the No Imagery
condition (High Fear: F(1,61) = 8.11, p = .006, hp2 = .12). Within the
low fear group, there was no signiﬁcant effect for Balcony
(F(1,61) = 2.19, p > .10, hp2 = .04). These results suggest that imagery
enhanced the perceived costs of being on the balcony, especially for
individuals who were afraid of heights.

Fig. 2. Group differences in height overestimation (visual matching) as a function of
the imagery manipulation. Note: Group mean (and SE bars) for height
overestimation (visual matching) of the balconies. Higher scores indicate greater
perceptual distortion (1.0 would indicate an accurate estimate). In this ﬁgure, the
asterisk reﬂects a signiﬁcant effect of Balcony (Imagery or No Imagery) within the
high fear group.

balconies. Regardless of fear status, we predicted that the falling
imagery condition would lead to greater perceptual distortion. In
addition, consistent with our earlier ﬁndings (Teachman et al.,
2008), we expected that individuals would be more likely to
overestimate the vertical extent of the balcony if they were afraid
of heights3.
To test these hypotheses, we ﬁrst conducted a repeatedmeasures ANCOVA, with one between-subjects factor (Height
Status) and one within-subjects factor (Balcony: Imagery versus
No Imagery). As expected, there was a signiﬁcant main effect for
Balcony, with individuals overestimating the vertical extent of the
balcony more following the imagery induction (versus No
Imagery; F(1,121) = 9.96, p = .002, hp2 = .08). However, contrary to
expectations, there was no signiﬁcant main effect for Height Status
(F(1,121) = .09, p > .10, hp2 = .001). Finally, there was a signiﬁcant
Balcony by Height Status interaction (F(1,121) = 4.16, p = .04,
hp2 = .03). Follow-up tests revealed that within the high fear
group, there was a signiﬁcant effect for Balcony (F(1,59) = 11.24,
p = .001, hp2 = .16), with high fear individuals overestimating the
vertical extent more when they imagined themselves falling off the
balcony (Balcony: Imagery) versus when they did not (Balcony: No
Imagery). There was no signiﬁcant effect for Balcony within the
low fear group (F(1,61) = .48, p > .10, hp2 = .008), nor was there a
signiﬁcant between-group fear difference in height estimation on
either balcony (both p > .10). See Fig. 2. These results suggest that
enhancing images of falling led to greater height overestimation,
particularly for those individuals who were predisposed to be
afraid of heights.
2.3.2. Follow-up analyses
While the overall pattern of results was clear, we should note
two surprising ﬁndings that emerged when conducting exploratory follow-up tests, looking at results for the 26- and 33-ft
balconies separately. First, individuals low in height fear overestimated the balcony height more than individuals high in height
fear on the No Imagery 26-ft balcony (F (1,61) = 5.21, p = .03,
hp2 = .08). This ﬁnding contradicts an earlier ﬁnding from our lab
(Teachman et al., 2008), where individuals high (versus low) in
height fear overestimated the vertical extent of the same balcony.
However, this surprising result in the current study should be

2.3. Visual perception as a function of imagery
2.3.1. Height overestimation
To examine the relationship between height fear, imagery, and
visual perception, we evaluated height estimations on both

3
One individual within the high fear group exhibited an extremely large height
overestimation on the ﬁrst balcony (three times the interquartile range for the rest
of the scores within the high fear group, and within the rest of the scores across the
entire sample); thus, this outlier data point was removed from all analyses.
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interpreted cautiously given that there was no difference in height
overestimation as a function of fear status for any of the other
balcony comparisons (26-ft Imagery, 33-ft Imagery, 33-ft No
Imagery; all p > .10). Second, the height estimation results appear
to be driven primarily by the 26-ft balcony (i.e., the main effect for
Height Status and the Height Status by Imagery interaction were
not signiﬁcant when looking at the 33-ft balcony alone, but were
both signiﬁcant for the 26-ft balcony). One explanation for this
discrepancy across balconies is that due to the shape of the 33-ft
balcony, it was somewhat more difﬁcult for participants to look
over the balcony’s ledge and back to the experimenter on the 33-ft
(versus 26-ft) balcony, resulting in more measurement error and
reduced opportunity for the imagery manipulation to impact
height estimates.
2.3.3. Size overestimation
To provide a relatively less direct measure of visual perception,
we also assessed the extent that participants overestimated the
size of a disk. As expected, the visual matching tasks on both
balconies were positively correlated with the size estimation tasks
on both balconies (Balcony: Imagery size and height: r = .46,
p < .001; Balcony: No Imagery size and height: r = .56, p < .001),
suggesting that visual matching and size estimation both tapped
into visual perception. In addition, to examine whether size
estimation differed as a function of the imagery manipulation and/
or fear status, we calculated a repeated-measures ANCOVA with
one between-subjects factor (Height Status) and one withinsubjects factor (Balcony: Imagery versus No Imagery). Contrary to
expectations, there was not a signiﬁcant effect for Height Status
(F(1,49) = .003, p > .10, hp2 < .0001), Balcony (F(1,49) = .0001, p > .10,
hp2 < .0001), or the Height Status by Imagery Status interaction
(F(1,49) = .10, p > .10, hp2 = .002). Note, however, that these ﬁndings
should be interpreted with caution given the limited sample size
and power for this test (i.e., size data were not available for the full
sample).
2.4. Relationships among perceptual and traditional height fear
measures
We hypothesized that measures of perceptual biases and height
fear would show the strongest relationships to one another when
concerns about acting in the height environment were activated.
Thus, we expected that height overestimation would be associated
more strongly with state (than trait) measures of height fear,
particularly on the Imagery balcony.
To examine relationships among variables, we ﬁrst computed
an average score across the state fear measures for both balconies:
peak anxiety (referred to as SUDS-average), anxious cognitions
(referred to as ACQ-average), and anxiety-related bodily sensations (referred to as BSQ-average). Additionally, we computed a
total score for the AQ—Anxiety and AQ—Avoidance trait measure.
Partially in line with predictions, the height estimates (using visual
matching) were more strongly related to the measures reﬂecting
state height fear on the Imagery (relative to No Imagery) balcony.
Speciﬁcally, fear of bodily sensations (BSQ-average) and anxious
cognitions (ACQ-average) were signiﬁcantly related to height
overestimation only in the Balcony: Imagery condition. Surprisingly, there was also a signiﬁcant relationship in the opposite
direction to hypotheses between trait height fear (AQ—Anxiety and
Avoidance) and height overestimation in the Balcony: No Imagery
condition. Finally, there was no signiﬁcant relationship between
AQ—Anxiety and Avoidance and height overestimation on the
Imagery balcony, nor was there a signiﬁcant relationship between
height overestimation and SUDS-average. See Table 2.
Note, the pattern of correlations was fairly similar when
examined solely within the high fear group, but the results more

385

Table 2
Pearson correlation coefﬁcients among perceptual and ‘traditional’ height fear
measures.

Anxious cognitions (ACQ-average)
Anxiety-related bodily sensations
(BSQ-average)
Peak state anxiety (SUDS-average)
Trait anxiety and avoidance
(AQ—Anxiety and Avoidance)

Visual Matching:
No Imagery Balcony

Visual Matching:
Imagery Balcony

.16y [.35**]
.13 [.27*]

.22* [.29*]
.23* [.28*]

.01 [.20]
.19* [.19]

.11 [.15]
.01 [.16]

Note: The state fear measures reported in this table refer to the average score for
both balconies, including: anxious cognitions (referred to as ACQ-average), anxietyrelated bodily sensations (referred to as BSQ-average), and peak anxiety (referred to
as SUDS-average). Additionally, AQ—Anxiety and Avoidance refers to the total score
for the AQ—Anxiety and AQ—Avoidance trait fear measure. The numbers in brackets
refer to correlation coefﬁcients in the high fear group alone.
y
p < .10 level.
*
p < .05 level.
**
p < .01 level.

consistently followed hypotheses. Speciﬁcally, among individuals
high in height fear, there was the expected signiﬁcant positive
relationship between height overestimation on the No Imagery
balcony and ACQ-average (r = .35, p = .005) and BSQ-average
(r = .27, p = .03). Furthermore, the surprising relationship between
height overestimation on the No Imagery balcony and AQ—Anxiety
and Avoidance did not reach signiﬁcance (r = .19, p = .13), though
the magnitude of the effect was comparable. Despite some
inconsistencies, overall these results suggest that, particularly
among individuals high in height fear, the height estimates were
more consistently related to the measures reﬂecting state (rather
than trait) height fear, especially when costs of interacting in the
environment were activated (i.e., on the Imagery balcony).
3. Discussion
The current study provides initial evidence that imagery
designed to enhance the perceived costs of interacting in a high
place may inﬂuence what people see at a perceptual level. As
expected, we found that individuals overestimated the vertical
extent of a balcony to a greater degree after they imagined
themselves falling over the balcony’s ledge, particularly if they
were already afraid of heights. Notably, because we used a visual
matching task that did not rely on verbal or retrospective report, it
is unlikely that height overestimation was simply a function of
distortions in judgment or other cognitive biases (as opposed to
biased visual perception). This view is strengthened by the ﬁnding
that the height estimates were positively related to estimates of
disk size, an indirect measure of the vertical extent.
These ﬁndings raise a number of intriguing possibilities with
respect to the relationship between perceptual biases and height
fear. First, the effect of imagery on visual perception suggests that
when participants enhanced the images of falling over the ledge,
thereby presumably increasing the subjective costs of being on the
balcony, this led to greater overestimations of the vertical extent.
This ﬁts with Profﬁtt’s (2006) notion that visual perception is not
only related to sensory input, but also to the subjective costs of
acting in a given environment. If one fears that he or she will fall
from a high place, it is adaptive to overestimate the height given
that this presumably will serve as a deterrent from getting too
close to the ledge. In other words, these ﬁndings suggest that
fearful individuals are not only thinking about the world in a more
threatening manner, they may be seeing it differently as well.
Nevertheless, we failed to ﬁnd fear group differences in height
overestimation. The primary exception to this pattern is our
surprising ﬁnding that individuals low (versus high) in height fear
actually overestimated the balcony height more on the No Imagery
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26-ft balcony. These ﬁndings are contrary to previous research
from our lab where we found that individuals high (versus low) in
height fear were more likely to overestimate the vertical extent of a
balcony (Teachman et al., 2008). Instead, in the current study we
did ﬁnd a signiﬁcant interaction between height fear and the
imagery condition. Individuals high in height fear overestimated
the vertical extent of the balcony signiﬁcantly more following the
imagery induction (versus without imagery), but this did not occur
for those low in height fear.
This ﬁnding is consistent with classic diathesis-stress models of
psychopathology (Abela, Brozina, & Seligman, 2004) and implies
these models might also apply to biased visual perception in fears
and phobias. Speciﬁcally, these ﬁndings suggest that preexisting
height fear may serve as a vulnerability (or diathesis) that leads to
greater perceptual biases when triggered by a stressor (in this case,
imagery designed to enhance perceived threat). One reason why
we found fear group differences in height estimates in our previous
work (Teachman et al., 2008), even without the explicit imagery
stressor, may be that there was a lot of spontaneous imagery of
falling occurring for the high fear group. This idea is supported by
the ﬁnding in the current study of elevated rates of mental imagery
of falling for the high fear group on the ﬁrst balcony (before the
imagery induction; see Fig. 1). It will be important in future work to
determine when fear alone will be sufﬁcient to amplify the
perceived costs of acting in a high place and inﬂuence perception,
or when a stressor will also be necessary (as in the current study).
It is also possible that the relationship between perceptual
and cognitive biases is bidirectional, and it will be critical to
manipulate each bias independently in the future in order to
evaluate their causal links more clearly.
Finally, we hypothesized that the relationships between
measures of perception and height fear would be stronger when
concerns about interacting in the environment were triggered.
Partially in line with this idea, we found that estimates of height
overestimation were more strongly related to the measures
reﬂecting state height fear on the Imagery (versus No Imagery)
balcony. Furthermore, when examining correlations solely within
the high fear group, we found a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between height overestimation and anxious cognitions (ACQaverage) and fear of bodily sensations (BSQ-average) across both
balconies. Note that in the current study, each of these measures
was administered while participants were standing on the balcony,
so the costs of being on the balcony (e.g., physical injury,
psychological distress) were likely salient. Surprisingly, there
was not a signiﬁcant relationship between height overestimation
and peak anxiety (measured with SUDS), another measure of state
height fear. This null ﬁnding may have been due to measurement
error, given that SUDS ratings (a single-item measure) have been
shown to lack sensitivity to differences in highly anxietyprovoking situations (Tryon, 1977).
3.1. Limitations and conclusions
These ﬁndings must be interpreted in light of several limitations.
First, it is difﬁcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions about the disk size
estimation task, given that only a subsample had available data.
Additionally, while planned analyses were largely in line with
hypotheses, exploratory follow-up tests revealed some inconsistencies. For instance, individuals low (versus high) in height fear
actually overestimated the height more on one of the four balcony
comparisons (26-ft Balcony: No Imagery). This ﬁnding directly
contradicted earlier evidence from our lab (Teachman et al., 2008),
and points to the possibility that individuals high in height fear may
not experience greater perceptual distortions than those low in
height fear, particularly when the costs of interacting in the
environment have not been primed (e.g., through imagery).

Furthermore, our height estimation results seemed largely driven
by the 26-ft (versus 33-ft) balcony. We recognize the limitations of
interpreting exploratory follow-up analyses; thus, we believe it is
important for future research to replicate our primary results using a
variety of different balconies and converging measures of height
estimation. Another potential limitation of the current study is that
our balconies had differing heights. While we minimized this issue
by using a ratio of height overestimation and by counterbalancing
balcony order, it does make direct comparison across the balconies
more difﬁcult. Finally, it will also be valuable to replicate these
ﬁndings in a diagnosed phobic, rather than high fearful sample.
In spite of these limitations, this study provides intriguing clues
regarding the relationship between visual perception, imagery,
and height fear. In particular, it appears that using imagery to
enhance fears of interacting in a dangerous environment can alter
the perception of that environment. Results also suggest that
height fear may serve as a vulnerability factor that leads to
perceptual biases when triggered by a stressor (in this case, images
of falling). It will be critical to determine which stressors interact
with height fear to enhance the costs of acting in a high place,
because we expect that perceptual biases will be most apparent
when these costs are heightened. Finally, exploring the parameters
under which perceptual biases will be related to other markers
of fear, as well as determining the extent to which these biases
predict onset and maintenance of fears and phobias, will be
important next steps.
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